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# Food Security Has a Price. Are We Prepared to Pay It?
- URL: https://www.ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk/food-security-has-a-price/
- Published: 2026-10-23T07:09:13.000Z
- Updated: 2026-10-23T07:27:53.000Z
- Description: Britain’s food system has proved remarkably resilient. But evidence to Parliament raises a harder question: if resilience requires investment, flexibility and spare capacity, who ultimately pays for it?
- Author: Forward View Consultancy
- Tags: Business Thinking, Winter 2026

**Britain’s food system has proved remarkably good at keeping shelves stocked through disruption. Evidence given to Parliament raises a more uncomfortable question: are we gradually removing the profitability, spare capacity and investment that made that resilience possible?**

There is a particular kind of investment decision in which most business advisers would be rather uncomfortable.

Commit a large proportion of your costs upfront. Wait months before discovering how much product you have made. Accept that one of the most important variables affecting output is entirely outside your control. Then sell into a market whose price may bear little relationship to your individual cost of production.

Welcome to farming.

Giving evidence to the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee on 12 October, farmer and Harry's Farm creator Harry Metcalfe gave MPs a stark illustration. His 2027 crop was already in the ground and, he said, **74% of its costs had already been incurred**.

What happened next would depend substantially upon the weather.

His conclusion was uncomfortable:

“Why am I going to continue to grow food when it's such a high risk activity?”

Later, the point became sharper still:

“right now as a farmer I'm doing everything I can to not grow food and that's just wrong.”

Those are the words of one farmer describing one business. They should not be presented as the condition of every UK farm.

But the economics behind them deserve much wider attention.¹

Because Britain's food-security debate may be asking the wrong question.

The issue is not simply whether Britain *can* produce more food.

It is whether producing that food remains a sufficiently rational use of capital for the businesses expected to do it.

**Resilience without profitability?**

The Public Accounts Committee hearing was examining something much larger than farm profitability: the resilience of the UK's food supply to disruption.

Its starting point was a National Audit Office report published in September. Food is one of the UK's 13 Critical National Infrastructure sectors. UK households spent £148 billion on food in 2025, excluding eating out, while UK production was equivalent to around 60% of the value of the food consumed here.²

The system has coped remarkably well with recent shocks. But the NAO warns that the risks confronting it include acute threats such as extreme weather, cyberattacks and energy disruption alongside longer-term pressures including climate change.³

Perhaps more significantly, the NAO found that Defra has largely relied upon the private sector to manage disruptions.

That makes the financial condition of that private sector rather important.

And this was one of the most striking features of the Parliamentary evidence: representatives of farming, retail and food manufacturing arrived at remarkably similar conclusions from different directions.

Jim Bligh of the British Retail Consortium argued that profit is necessary to create the conditions for investment, growth and adaptation. Balwinder Dhoot of the Food and Drink Federation similarly argued that resilience comes down to investment. If businesses cannot make money here, the consequence can eventually be the loss of farming or production capacity.

Balwinder Dhoot offered perhaps the best description of what worries him.

A **slow puncture**.

Domestic production does not need to disappear overnight for resilience to deteriorate. Capacity can be gradually weakened as investment becomes harder to justify, production moves elsewhere or businesses simply choose less risky uses for their capital.¹

That distinction matters.

Food insecurity does not have to begin with empty shelves.

It can begin years earlier, with an investment that wasn't made.

**A difficult harvest, but not a simple picture**

The Parliamentary evidence followed another difficult growing season.

AHDB's final 2026 harvest survey calculated an average UK wheat yield of 6.9 tonnes per hectare, around 11% below its five-year average. Spring barley averaged 4.8t/ha, around 17% below its five-year average, while oats averaged 4.6t/ha, around 14% below average. Oilseed rape moved in the other direction, reaching 4.0t/ha, around 19% above its five-year average.⁴

The spread within those figures is just as important as the averages. AHDB reported winter-wheat yields ranging from 3.9t/ha to 11.5t/ha and emphasised considerable variation between farms and regions. Limited rainfall from spring onwards played a significant role.⁴

Defra's provisional **England** figures provide an equally useful warning against simplistic headlines. English wheat production is estimated at 10.8 million tonnes, 0.8% higher than 2025, as yield improvement outweighed a reduction in planted area. Barley production, however, fell 11% to 3.7 million tonnes, including a 23% fall in spring-barley production. Oats also fell, while oilseed-rape production increased strongly.⁵

So this is not a story in which every crop failed everywhere.

It is something perhaps more awkward for business planning: **variability**.

Different crops, soils, farms and regions can experience the same year very differently.

Harry Metcalfe repeatedly made that distinction to MPs, contrasting the experience of his arable operation with livestock businesses and with farms elsewhere in Britain.¹

National food resilience therefore cannot simply mean solving an imaginary average farm.

There isn't one.

**The efficiency problem**

The second witness panel took the argument somewhere deeper.

Professor Tim Lang, Emeritus Professor of Food Policy, challenged a model that has spent decades pursuing progressively greater efficiency. Just-in-time supply, concentrated infrastructure and long supply chains can achieve extraordinary efficiency in normal conditions.

But resilience asks for something else.

Diversity.

Storage.

Flexibility.

Alternative routes.

Spare capacity.

Professor Tim Lang's argument was that some of those characteristics have been driven out by the pursuit of what he termed “super efficiency”.¹

And here the hearing exposed a genuinely difficult trade-off.

Jim Bligh made the case from the opposite direction. Just-in-time works precisely because holding stock costs money. Those efficiencies help retailers keep food affordable. He nevertheless acknowledged an argument for having more “just in case” capacity and questioned whether existing stocks would be sufficient in a significant national emergency.¹

Both can be right.

A warehouse full of inventory that is rarely required has a financial cost.

A second source of supply costs money.

Redundant processing capacity costs money.

Water storage costs money.

More flexible infrastructure generally costs money.

But discovering during a crisis that the leanest possible system has no room left to adapt has a cost too.

**Efficiency removes waste. Resilience deliberately preserves options.**

The business question is therefore no longer whether efficiency is good and redundancy bad.

It is how much apparent inefficiency we are prepared to maintain as insurance against circumstances in which the efficient route stops working.

And, critically, **who pays for it?**

**Food security doesn't stop at the farm gate**

The political shorthand around food security often gravitates towards farmers and hectares.

The hearing repeatedly demonstrated why that is inadequate.

Growing food is only one part of a system that also requires processing, energy, storage, refrigeration, transportation, ports, abattoirs, feed mills, fertiliser, veterinary services, logistics and retail.

Balwinder Dhoot warned that when processing moves overseas, the purchasing of agricultural ingredients can move with it. Jim Bligh similarly argued for identifying weaknesses in domestic processing capacity and pointed to carbon dioxide as one area on which different parts of food manufacturing depend.¹

The National Audit Office describes the supply chain as highly interconnected, stretching from production through manufacturing, storage and distribution to wholesale, retail and catering.³

That changes the question.

A country can have extraordinarily productive farms and still possess a vulnerable food system.

An acre of wheat is productive capacity.

But its resilience also depends upon what happens after the combine leaves the field.

**British or imported? It isn't that simple**

There is an understandable instinct to equate greater domestic production with greater food security.

The hearing showed why the reality is more complicated.

Representing retailers, Jim Bligh argued both for increasing British production **and** for maintaining diverse international sources of supply.¹

Those positions are not contradictory.

If all supply originates domestically, a national drought or disease outbreak becomes extremely dangerous.

If domestic production is allowed to atrophy because imports are cheaper, Britain becomes increasingly exposed to climatic, geopolitical, logistical and trade disruption elsewhere.

Imports can therefore strengthen resilience.

So can domestic production.

The objective should not be purity. It should be **diversification of risk**.

That means asking a more sophisticated question than the percentage of food that happens to carry a Union flag.

What domestic productive capacity must Britain retain?

Which supplies can safely be sourced internationally?

Where are the processing bottlenecks?

Which imported inputs could stop domestic production even when the farm itself remains capable of producing?

Where does the system have only one practical route?

Food security starts looking less like an argument about self-sufficiency and much more like the construction of a balanced investment portfolio.

**Government cannot control the weather**

There was understandable criticism of Government throughout the hearing.

But one of Harry Metcalfe's more useful observations was also one of the simplest: Government cannot control the weather.¹

It cannot eliminate the underlying biological risk of farming either.

The interesting policy question is what it *can* influence.

Planning.

Investment conditions.

Regulation.

Environmental payments.

Infrastructure.

Trade.

The treatment of food within national resilience planning.

And, perhaps most importantly for businesses making investments measured in years rather than months, **certainty**.

The Sustainable Farming Incentive illustrates both the opportunity and the tension.

Defra says there were 48,000 live SFI agreements managed by 38,300 farm businesses as at 1 September 2026.⁶ Defra describes SFI as providing payments for actions intended to improve farm resilience and profitability alongside environmental outcomes.⁷

But policy design and business planning operate on very different clocks.

Harry Metcalfe's final request to MPs was not simply for another payment. He asked Government to understand that farming is a long-term business operating around seasons rather than conventional short planning cycles. He acknowledged the environmental improvements he had seen from SFI actions while questioning how current incentives encourage him to return to producing more food.¹

That's an important distinction.

Environmental resilience and food production need not be enemies.

Indeed, healthier soils, better water management and reduced dependence upon vulnerable inputs can strengthen productive resilience. Defra itself makes that connection in its 2026 SFI material.⁷

The harder task is designing a framework in which environmental improvement, long-term productive capacity and viable farming businesses reinforce one another rather than competing for the same acre.

**Resilience is not emergency planning**

Perhaps the most important contribution came from Professor Neil Ward.

He distinguished between the shocks that make headlines and the chronic pressures building beneath them.

A resilient food system must cope with both.

That means the policy discussion cannot begin when an oil tanker is interrupted, a power grid fails or a drought has already destroyed yield.

By then, much of the system's ability to respond has already been determined.

How many processors survived the preceding decade?

How much storage remains?

What condition is the soil in?

How diverse are the supply routes?

Can businesses finance new infrastructure?

Can farms absorb another poor year?

Did the previous good year create investment capacity or merely repair the losses of the one before it?

Professor Neil Ward ultimately characterised food-system resilience as a **public good**, requiring sustained partnership between government, industry and civil society. Professor Tim Lang argued for more networked supply systems rather than excessive dependency upon narrow supply chains.¹

Their argument raises an uncomfortable economic problem.

If resilience benefits everybody, but the cost of providing it sits with an individual business, the market may provide less of it than society actually wants.

The spare warehouse looks inefficient until it is needed.

The alternative supplier looks expensive until the primary supplier fails.

The reservoir looks like capital tied up until the rain stops.

The processor looks uncompetitive until importing becomes impossible.

And productive farmland can look like an underperforming asset until a resilient domestic food supply suddenly matters very much.

**What are we actually buying?**

This may be the debate Britain needs to have.

Not whether Government or the market should “solve” food security.

Not whether British production is inherently superior to imported food.

Not whether environmental management should defeat food production or vice versa.

The harder question is:

**What level of resilience do we actually want, what does it cost, and how should that cost be shared?**

The last few years have shown an impressive capacity within farming, manufacturing, logistics and retail to adapt when circumstances change. The fact that consumers have largely continued to find food on supermarket shelves should be recognised as an achievement, not taken as proof that the underlying system is invulnerable. The NAO explicitly says risks are complex and becoming more likely, with potentially more severe impacts.³

A profitable farmer is not a guarantee of food security.

Neither is a profitable processor, a well-stocked supermarket or a diverse import programme.

But systematically weakening the ability of those businesses to invest while simultaneously asking them to withstand greater volatility is difficult to reconcile.

Perhaps the lesson from the Public Accounts Committee is therefore not that Britain's food system is broken.

It is that its resilience has value.

And value has a price.

The question is whether we recognise that price **before** we find ourselves having to pay considerably more for its absence.

---

**References**

1. House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, *Oral evidence: Resilience of the UK's food supply to disruptions, HC 717*, 12 October 2026, published 19 October 2026\. [\[committees...liament.uk\]](https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/18107/pdf/?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk), [\[committees...liament.uk\]](https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/127/public-accounts/publications/oral-evidence/?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk)
2. National Audit Office, *Resilience of the food supply chain to disruptions: Summary*, HC 587, 4 September 2026\. [\[nao.org.uk\]](https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Resilience-of-the-food-supply-chain-to-disruptions-summary.pdf?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk)
3. National Audit Office, *Resilience of the food supply chain to disruptions*, 4 September 2026\. [\[nao.org.uk\]](https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/resilience-of-the-food-supply-chain-to-disruptions/?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk)
4. Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board, ‘Final harvest report confirms cereal yields are below historic averages across the UK’, 25 September 2026\. [\[ahdb.org.uk\]](https://ahdb.org.uk/news/final-harvest-report-confirms-cereal-yields-are-below-historic-averages-across-the-uk?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk), [\[ahdb.org.uk\]](https://ahdb.org.uk/cereals-oilseeds/gb-harvest-progress?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk)
5. Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, *Provisional cereal and oilseed production estimates for England 2026*, updated 8 October 2026\. [\[gov.uk\]](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cereal-and-oilseed-rape-production/provisional-cereal-and-oilseed-production-estimates-for-england-2026?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk)
6. Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, *Sustainable Farming Incentive agreement uptake and applications: September 2026*, 9 September 2026\. [\[gov.uk\]](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/sfi-uptake-september-2026/sustainable-farming-incentive-agreement-uptake-and-applications-september-2026?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk)
7. Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, *Getting started with the Sustainable Farming Incentive in 2026*, June 2026\. [\[defrafarmi...log.gov.uk\]](https://defrafarming.blog.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/246/2026/06/Defra-SFI-2026-6page-Leaflet-May%5FV4-web-1-1.pdf?ref=ruralbusinessinsights.co.uk)